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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present the results of two surveys that 
investigate subjects’ judgments about what can be known 
or justifiably believed about lottery outcomes on the basis 
of statistical evidence, testimonial evidence, and “mixed” 
evidence, while considering possible anchoring and priming 
effects. We discuss these results in light of seven distinct 
hypotheses that capture various claims made by philosophers 
about lay people’s lottery judgments. We conclude by 
summarizing the main findings, pointing to future research, 
and comparing our findings to recent studies by Turri and 
Friedman.
1. Introduction
Consider the proposition that a particular ticket has lost a lottery. Call this a 
lottery proposition. Many philosophers report the intuition that one cannot know 
a lottery proposition based on purely statistical evidence – one cannot know that 
a ticket has lost based purely on the overwhelming odds against it winning. This 
“lottery intuition” has exerted considerable influence in recent epistemology. It has 
been endorsed by Cohen (1998), Dretske (1970), Nelkin (2000), Nozick (1981), 
Pritchard (2005), Smith (2010), Vogel (1990), Williamson (2000), Williamson 
(2009b), and many others.1 Those who endorse the lottery intuition often take it 
to be widely shared among philosophers and “lay people” alike. So, for example, 
John Hawthorne writes in the introduction to Knowledge and Lotteries:
And yet I take it as a datum that there is a strong inclination to claim that the relevant 
lottery propositions are not known. Nor is this merely a datum about the inclinations 
of philosophers. After all, the motto of the New York State lottery is ‘Hey, you never 
know’. (Hawthorne, 2004, p.8)
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In a similar fashion, Peter Baumann writes:
Almost everybody seems to agree that nobody can know the outcome of a lottery in 
advance or just on the basis of the statistical evidence (even if that evidence is over-
whelmingly in favor of a certain outcome). (Baumann, 2004, p. 416)
The lottery intuition plays a wide-ranging role in current epistemological theoriz-
ing. So, for example, it is often appealed to as an adequacy constraint to motivate 
or test various conditions on knowledge, such as safety (anti-luck), sensitivity, reli-
abilist, or normalcy conditions. Also, the lottery intuition features in a number of 
well-known epistemic puzzles2 which epistemologists typically try to solve in such 
a way as to leave the lottery intuition intact. Moreover, it has played an important 
role in the debate over norms of assertion, and figures centrally in Williamson’s 
widely discussed defense of the knowledge norm.3
As well as denying that one can know a lottery proposition based purely on the 
odds against it winning, some philosophers have gone further and denied that one 
can even justifiably believe a lottery proposition on this basis (Nelkin, 2000; Sutton, 
2007; more recently, Smith, 2010, 2016; Smithies, 2012). Those who endorse this 
claim, however, rarely describe it as “intuitive” or widely accepted, and almost 
universally regard it as something standing in need of substantial argument.
Lay judgments about what we can know and justifiably believe about lottery 
outcomes have recently been scrutinized in two experimental philosophy studies 
by Turri and Friedman (2014) and Friedman and Turri (2015). Turri and Friedman 
found that an impressive majority of subjects (∼90%) do share the lottery intuition, 
judging that one cannot know a lottery proposition based purely on statistical 
evidence. The studies also showed that a nearly as impressive majority of subjects 
(∼80%) judged that one could justifiably believe a lottery proposition purely on 
the basis of statistical evidence. Turri and Friedman take these findings to weigh 
against certain views about lottery judgments, such as what they call the “justi-
fication account.” According to this account, the reason people judge that one 
cannot know that a lottery ticket is a loser based purely on statistical evidence 
is because they judge that one cannot justifiably believe that a lottery ticket is a 
loser based purely on statistical evidence, and take justification to be necessary 
for knowledge. As Turri and Friedman claim:
The justification account says that in basic lottery cases people deny knowledge because 
they think justification is absent. So if the justification account is correct, very few partic-
ipants should say that Lois is justified in thinking that the ticket is a loser … The results 
were highly unfavorable to the justification account. (Turri & Friedman, 2014, pp. 49–50)
We agree that Turri and Friedman’s findings weigh against the justification account, 
but are very doubtful whether the account has ever been endorsed in quite the 
way that Turri and Friedman describe.4
Turri and Friedman also suggest that their findings may put pressure on certain 
substantial views about the nature of knowledge and justification and the rela-
tionship between the two. They single out in particular the recently prominent 
“knowledge account” of justification, on which knowledge and justified belief are 
taken to be identical:
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PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  3
Our results … should be taken into consideration when evaluating the increasingly 
popular “knowledge-first” approach in epistemology … Perhaps the most radical plank 
in the knowledge-first platform is the identification of justification with knowledge 
(Sutton, 2007). To the extent that this is supposed to reflect the way people actually 
think about knowledge, our results undermine the view. (Turri & Friedman, 2014, p. 32)
Again, we are inclined to doubt that Turri and Friedman’s results, or indeed our 
results, directly bear against the knowledge account, mainly because it is doubtful 
that its proponents consider the view to be genuinely descriptive of how lay people 
judge the epistemic status of lottery propositions. Sutton, in fact, acknowledges 
that his view clashes with ordinary judgments about when lottery propositions 
can be justifiably believed, and he offers an explanation for why people judge the 
way they do – we will discuss his proposal in more detail below.
Now, of course, there is a general debate about the extent to which lay intuitions 
about philosophical thought experiments bear upon philosophical theorizing of 
this sort. Some critics suggest that lay intuitions are less trustworthy than those of 
experts – that is, professional philosophers.5 Others have taken an even harder line 
and denied that intuitions have any general relevance for the evaluation of philo-
sophical claims – be they the intuitions of lay people or professional philosophers.6 
Here we won’t take a stance on this issue, nor do we have to take a stance, since our 
investigation has a different focus. Philosophers writing in epistemology have not 
shied away from claims that are explicitly about lay people’s judgments and which 
can be straightforwardly tested by surveying these judgments. We have seen exam-
ples of such claims in the above quotes, and more will be discussed below. One might 
deny that these are proper “philosophical” claims (their appearance in philosophical 
works notwithstanding) but we won’t attempt to enforce any such boundary here.7
The main aim of this paper, then, is to investigate lay people’s judgments about 
lotteries. As well as attempting to replicate the results of previous studies, we 
extended these studies in various ways. Drawing upon recent psychological stud-
ies, we also tested whether lottery judgments are sensitive to the size of the lottery 
involved and to the strength of the statistical evidence presented. Relatedly, we 
undertook to test whether lottery judgments exhibited an anchoring effect when 
subjects were asked about a sequence of lotteries either increasing or decreasing 
in size. And, finally, by drawing on recent philosophical discussion of the lottery 
cases, we tested for whether lottery judgments were subject to a priming effect in 
light of a distinction between the proposition that a given ticket is a loser and the 
proposition that a given ticket is probably a loser.
In order to structure the discussion of our methodology and our results, we 
will first identify and provide prima facie motivation for seven distinct hypoth-
eses capturing numerous claims made by philosophers concerning lay people’s 
judgments about lotteries. In the following section, we explain how we tested for 
these hypotheses by outlining the details of our surveys and offer some motivation 
for our preferred statistical methodology. In Section 4, we present and discuss 
the main findings from our surveys, followed by a discussion of these results in 
relation to the seven hypotheses. We close by comparing our results to the other 
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two studies, assess potential repercussions of our findings, and suggest some future 
directions for further studies on this topic.
2. Motivating seven hypotheses
We begin with two hypotheses strongly supported by Turri and Friedman’s results:
Hypothesis 1: No-knowledge
People have a general tendency to deny knowledge of lottery propositions 
when the evidence is statistical.
Hypothesis 2: Yes-Justification
People have a general tendency to ascribe justified belief in lottery proposi-
tions when the evidence is statistical.
We assume a fair and decent sized lottery (more on this below when we outline 
our vignettes). Importantly, the assumption here is that the belief in the lottery 
proposition is supported only by the relevant statistical evidence derived from 
the setup of the lottery.
The third hypothesis can be motivated by appeal to a well-known study in 
psychology, Wells (1992), which has established the aptly named “Wells effect”: 
subjects are very reluctant to make liability decisions based on “naked” statis-
tics, that is, purely statistical evidence, in a simulated court case. In contrast, 
subjects are often willing to make liability judgments based on testimonial 
evidence, even if, from a probabilistic perspective, the relevant testimony is less 
probative than the statistical evidence. This leads us to our third hypothesis to 
be tested (which was also tested in detail in Turri & Friedman, 2014; Friedman 
& Turri, 2015).
Hypothesis 3: Testimonial
People have a stronger tendency to ascribe knowledge of lottery proposi-
tions when the evidence is testimonial as opposed to when it is statistical.
While the previous two studies concerned propositions expressed by sentences 
of the form “this ticket is a losing ticket” – propositions that we label lottery prop-
ositions (LP) – it is important to also consider what we call probabilistic lottery 
propositions (PLP), expressed by sentences of the form: ‘it is very likely that this 
ticket is a losing ticket.’ Many of the philosophers who have denied that statistical 
evidence can provide justification for believing lottery propositions grant that it 
can nevertheless provide justification for believing probabilistic lottery proposi-
tions – that one can justifiably believe that a ticket has very likely lost a lottery 
based only on statistical evidence (compare Nelkin, 2000; Smith, 2010, 2016; 
Smithies, 2012; Sutton, 2007).
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PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  5
Hypothesis 4: Probabilistic
People have a stronger tendency to ascribe justified belief in probabilistic 
lottery propositions as opposed to categorical lottery propositions, and this 
effect will be particularly pronounced when the evidence is statistical.
As noted above, philosophers who defend the claim that one cannot justifiably 
believe lottery propositions on the basis of statistical evidence don’t generally take 
the claim to be “intuitive” and often concede that many people have the opposite 
intuition – that one can justifiably believe lottery propositions on the basis of 
statistical evidence. Some of these philosophers, however, write as though this 
contrary intuition may weaken once people are made aware of the distinction 
between lottery propositions and probabilistic lottery propositions (Nelkin, 2000; 
Smith, 2010, 2016; Smithies, 2012). Sutton (2007), however, is more explicit, sug-
gesting that a failure to distinguish between lottery propositions and probabilistic 
lottery propositions may be directly responsible for philosophers and lay people’s 
tendency to judge that lottery propositions can be justifiably believed on the basis 
of statistical evidence.
Just as “belief that p” is loosely used to denote both belief that p strictly speaking and 
mere belief that probably p, “justified belief that p” is loosely used to denote both jus-
tified belief that p strictly speaking and mere justified belief that probably p. This is 
a usage beyond reproach on many occasions for philosophers and non-philosophers 
alike … If one draws no distinction between categorical beliefs and their probabilistic 
counterparts, of course I am justified in believing that my lottery ticket will not win. 
(Sutton, 2007, p. 65)
If these suggestions are on the right track, then one would expect subjects to 
exhibit a reduced tendency to judge that lottery propositions can be justifiably 
believed on the basis of statistical evidence when the distinction between proba-
bilistic and categorical lottery propositions is made salient. Our own class room 
experience (PAE and MS) tentatively offered some anecdotal “evidence” in favor 
of the hypothesis that people will revise their initial judgment once they are aware 
of the relevant distinction. This thus leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Priming
People will be less willing to ascribe justified belief in lottery propositions 
when primed with a question about probabilistic lottery propositions. This 
effect will be particularly pronounced when the evidence is statistical.
Two further hypotheses are concerned with the following claim that is often made 
in combination with the lottery intuition – and here again the intention would 
seem to be that the claim has appeal for philosophers and lay people alike:
No matter how high the odds that the ticket will not win, it strikes us that the tick-
et-holder doesn’t know that his ticket will not win. (Vogel, 1990, p. 16, emphasis in the 
original, bold added)
Similarly, Cohen writes:
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Suppose S holds a ticket in a fair lottery of n tickets, where the probability 1 - 1/n of 
losing is very high. Does S know that his ticket will lose? Although (if n is suitably 
large) S has good reasons to believe that he will lose, it does not seem right to say that 
S knows that he will lose. This remains true for arbitrarily large n. (Cohen, 1988, p. 92, 
emphasis added)
Finally, according to Williamson:
On the merely probabilistic grounds that your ticket was only one of very many, I assert 
to you flat-out “Your ticket did not win”, without telling you my grounds. Intuitively, 
my grounds are quite inadequate for that outright unqualified assertion, even though 
one can construct the example to make its probability on my evidence as high as one likes, 
short of 1, by increasing the number of tickets in the lottery. You will still be entitled to 
feel some resentment when you later discover the merely probabilistic grounds for my 
assertions. (Williamson, 2000, p. 246, emphasis added)
These authors, and others, share the judgment that one cannot know a lottery 
proposition on the basis of purely probabilistic evidence no matter how strong that 
evidence is and no matter how probable the lottery proposition is made.
However, in a follow-up study to Wells’ influential paper mentioned above, 
Wright, Maceachern, Stoffer, & Macdonald, 1996) showed that the Wells effect 
does become much less pronounced as the relevant probabilities are increased. 
Wright and colleagues showed that willingness among mock jurors to make liabil-
ity judgments on the basis of statistical evidence increased significantly when the 
probabilistic strength of that evidence was substantially increased. Hence, Wright 
and colleagues, as well as our own classroom experience, which tentatively sug-
gested that students confronted with extreme odds tended to change their initial 
judgment about whether they can know a lottery proposition, provides reason 
to test whether knowledge judgments are, after all, affected by an increase in the 
relevant probability. Hence, we tested the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: Large Lotteries
When the evidence is statistical, people will have a stronger tendency to 
ascribe knowledge of lottery propositions if the lottery in question is very 
large.
Lastly, given the vast number of studies in psychology on so-called anchoring 
effects, we decided to also test whether the lottery intuition was subject to such 
effects.
Hypothesis 7: Anchoring
When the evidence is statistical, people’s willingness to ascribe knowl-
edge of lottery propositions will be sensitive to the size of the lotteries they 
have been asked about previously. More precisely, when presented with 
a sequence of increasing or decreasing lotteries, people’s willingness to 
ascribe knowledge of lottery propositions will be subject to an anchoring 
effect.
It’s important to point out that this last hypothesis presupposes, in effect, that the 
Large-Lotteries hypothesis is borne out, at least to some extent. That is, the lottery 
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PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  7
intuition won’t be a serious candidate for an anchoring effect unless it does exhibit 
some sensitivity to the size of the lottery involved.
3. Methods
3.1. General survey design and recruitment
We recruited participants for our surveys using Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Participants were paid between $0.25–$0.50, depending on survey (they were 
not allowed to take part in more than one survey). We restricted participation to 
native English speakers only. Participants were asked for personal information 
(age, native language, philosophy background, and highest completed degree). 
Following a suggestion from Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich, and Musch (2013), par-
ticipants were offered the opportunity, after having filled out the survey, to note 
whether they’d done so seriously without affecting their pay. We added compre-
hension questions and deleted the three fastest and three slowest responses.8 In 
total, we recruited 500 participants for 2 different surveys: 300 for survey 1; 200 
for survey 2. Each survey had two versions and we recruited 200 for survey 1 
version 1 and 100 for the others. Numbers of valid participants for survey 1: 182 
for version 1 and 87 for version 2. Survey 2: 80 for version 1 and 88 for version 
2. The reason for doubling the numbers for version 1 was that subjects selected 
their responses from drop-down menus in our surveys and we wanted to test 
for ordering effects, that is, whether the order in which responses appear in the 
dropdown box made a difference. No ordering effect was detected, and so the 
results were pooled.
In our vignettes we made the relevant probabilities of winning/losing explicit 
and we presented them in terms of ratios as well as percentages. Also, we empha-
sized that a winning ticket must match all lottery numbers, and that all other 
tickets are considered losing tickets.9 In order to contrast belief explicitly with 
justified belief or knowledge, we built into the vignettes the assumption that the 
subject believes that the ticket has lost.10 More generally, we first asked for Yes/
No answers to the justification/knowledge question, followed by a question about 
confidence in the relevant answer using a five-point Likert scale, with the options: 
totally confident, highly confident, moderately confident, somewhat confident, 
not at all confident.
Lastly, the data-sets and code supporting our results are available in the Zenodo 
repository in a citable format (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.815622) and on 
GitHub (https://github.com/iandurbach/lotteryjudgements). Any updates will be 
posted on GitHub.
3.1.1. Survey 1
In order to test for hypothesis 2, we introduced the following simple vignette:
Vignette 1: Probabilistic evidence
Harry owns a single ticket in a lottery. His numbers are 23-42-12-8-28-31. The only 
way for a ticket to win is to match all six numbers, and any other ticket is a losing 
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ticket. Harry wasn’t able to watch the evening news at which the winning numbers were 
announced. He recalls from his statistics class that the chance of a single ticket winning 
this lottery is one in 14 million, i.e. there is a 99.999993% chance that his ticket has lost.
Suppose Harry believes that the ticket has lost.
Is Harry justified in believing that the ticket has lost? (Yes/No – how confident are you 
about your answer?)
In order to test for hypothesis 3, we offered the following further 2 vignettes:
Vignette 2: Testimonial evidence
Harry owns a single ticket in a lottery. His numbers are 23-42-12-8-28-31. The only 
way for a ticket to win is to match all six numbers, and any other ticket is a losing 
ticket. Harry has just watched the evening news at which the winning numbers were 
announced and none of his numbers match.
Suppose Harry believes that the ticket has lost.
Is Harry justified in believing that the ticket has lost?
Taking again our cue from Turri and Friedman, we also introduced so-called 
mixed cases in which testimonial evidence is presented along with statistical evi-
dence pertaining to its reliability.
Vignette 3: Mixed evidence
Harry owns a single ticket in a lottery. His numbers are 23-42-12-8-28-31. The only 
way for a ticket to win is to match all six numbers, and any other ticket is a losing 
ticket. Harry has just watched the evening news at which the winning numbers were 
announced and none of his numbers match. The following TV show, however, features 
TV blunders and reports on a TV anchor who once read out the wrong results (not a 
single number the anchor reported was correct). A statistician reliably calculates the 
chance of this happening is one in a million, i.e. there is a 99.9999% chance that the 
anchor read out the correct results.
Suppose Harry believes that the ticket has lost.
Is Harry justified in believing that the ticket has lost?
In order to test for hypotheses 4 and 5, we created a slightly revised version of 
survey 1, which makes the distinction between a standard and probabilistic lot-
tery proposition salient but is otherwise the same. To wit, the first vignette was 
adjusted as follows.
Vignette 1*: Probabilistic evidence
Harry and Jennifer together own a single ticket in a lottery. Their numbers are 23-42-
12-8-28-31. The only way for a ticket to win is to match all six numbers, and any other 
ticket is a losing ticket. Neither Harry nor Jennifer were able to watch the evening news 
at which the winning numbers were announced. They recall from their statistics class 
that the chance of a single ticket winning this lottery is one in 14 million, i.e. there is a 
99.999993% chance that the ticket has lost.
Suppose Harry believes that the ticket is very likely to have lost.
Is Harry justified in believing that the ticket is very likely to have lost?
Suppose that in the previous question (Q1) Jennifer believes that the ticket has lost.
Is Jennifer justified in believing that the ticket has lost?
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PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  9
3.1.2. Survey 2
The second survey was intended to test hypotheses 1, 6, and 7 (while also providing 
further data for hypotheses 2 and 3). In contrast to survey 1, we specified that the 
ticket is indeed a losing ticket, we specified the prize-money involved and kept 
that winning amount – the stakes – fixed throughout our vignettes. We then tested 
for three phenomena: first, whether subjects are willing to ascribe knowledge of 
a lottery proposition, second, whether the strength of the statistical evidence has 
effects on a subject’s willingness to ascribe knowledge (or justification), and lastly 
whether subjects offer different answers with regards to the knowledge/justifica-
tion question if they have been previously exposed to larger or smaller lotteries.
We used the following vignettes:
Vignette 1 (survey 2)
Harry owns a single ticket in a local raffle. His number is 9464. There is at most one 
winning ticket. The winner receives 100,000 US Dollars. Harry wasn’t able to watch the 
local news at which the winning ticket was announced but he knows that the chance of 
winning is 1 in 10,000, i.e. there is a 99.99% chance that his ticket has lost.
Suppose Harry believes the ticket has lost and suppose that his ticket is a losing ticket.
Is Harry justified in believing that the ticket has lost? (Yes/No – how confident are you 
about your answer?)
With regard to the previous lottery in Q1, does Harry know that the ticket has lost? 
(Yes/No – how confident are you about your answer?)
We asked subjects the same question but changed the relevant probabilities 
involved to 1 in 14 Million, and 1 in 100 Million.
A second group of subjects were exposed to similar vignettes, however, involv-
ing first the Universal Lottery (with a chance of winning of 1 in 1080), followed 
by a reduction of probabilities, to 1 in 100 Million chance of winning, and 1 in 
14 Million.
Lastly, similarly to survey 1, we also tested for so-called mixed cases with 
respect to the knowledge and justification question. To do so, we introduced, as 
the last vignette in survey 2, the so-called Mafia case (very similar to a case used 
in Turri & Friedman, 2014; Friedman & Turri, 2015), which was then compared 
to the relevant vignette using the same probability of winning.
Vignette Mafia
Harry owns a single ticket in this week’s lottery. His numbers are 23-42-12-8-28-31. 
The only winning ticket is one that matches all six numbers, and all others are losing 
tickets. The winner receives 100,000 US Dollars. He recalls from his statistics class 
that the chance of a single ticket winning this lottery is one in 14 million, i.e. there is a 
99.999993% chance that his ticket has lost.
Harry hasn’t seen the official results of the lottery. However, he has just read a reliable 
news report that the Mafia has in fact rigged the latest lottery and thus the chance of any 
one ticket winning the lottery is now 1 in 100 Million, i.e. there is now a 99.999999% 
chance that his ticket has lost.
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3.2. Statistical methods: General remarks
The statistical methodology that we employ is not widely used in philosophy. We 
provide a general motivation for it here, before explaining how it was implemented 
in analyzing the data from each survey. Readers impatient for the results can move 
directly to Section 4 without loss of continuity. Our methodology contrasts with 
a more conventional approach in which each hypothesis is assessed in isolation 
using an independent statistical model (in the form of a formal hypothesis test). 
The conventional approach has the advantage that relatively simple statistical 
models can be used. As each hypothesis is treated “on its own,” there is typi-
cally a single outcome of interest and a single explanatory variable. For example, 
our hypothesis that people will be less willing to ascribe justified belief in a lot-
tery proposition when primed with a probabilistic question would be assessed 
by forming two groups of responses, one containing all primed responses and 
another containing all those obtained without priming. We would then calculate 
the proportion ascribing justified belief in each group, and compare these two 
proportions formally using a t-test.
This approach, however, suffers from three drawbacks. Firstly, as the number 
of independent tests increases, the probability of finding a statistically significant 
result in error – a false positive or type-I error – increases. Various adjustments 
can be made to the level at which “significance” is flagged but these are not without 
problems of their own.11 Secondly, because the same participant answers multiple 
questions, a group can contain more than one response from the same partici-
pant, violating the assumption that observations are independent. For example, 
consider again our priming hypothesis: the same participant is primed (or not), 
and then answers several questions ascribing justified belief based on different 
types of evidence. Now, if we include all his or her answers in the primed group 
of responses – pooling across evidence type – we violate the assumption that 
responses are independent. If we instead choose to separate out different evidence 
types, evaluating the priming hypothesis independently in each, the number of 
hypotheses proliferates, and with it the associated probability of a type-I error. 
Finally, testing a hypothesis in isolation by definition focuses on the effect of one 
explanatory variable while ignoring others, which can lead to spurious results 
when explanatory variables combine with one another to influence the outcome, 
as is often the case.
Modern statistical practice thus strongly advocates modeling the effect of all rel-
evant explanatory variables on an outcome jointly in a single model, and account-
ing for correlations introduced by multiple responses from the same participant 
using an appropriate method. By far the two most dominant methodologies in 
this area are generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs; see, e.g., McCulloch & 
Neuhaus, 2001) and generalized estimating equations (GEEs; see, e.g., Hardin, 
2005). Both of these model the joint effect of a set of explanatory variables on 
an outcome of interest, thus addressing the first and third of the drawbacks 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
 at
 07
:44
 18
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  11
mentioned above, but differ in the way in which they model correlations intro-
duced by dependent observations.
A detailed assessment of these differences is beyond the scope of our paper.12 
But, to summarize, a feature of dependent observations is that each participant 
has his or her own “effect” (by virtue of answering multiple questions). GLMMs 
model these explicitly, by assuming that participant effects are drawn from an 
appropriately chosen distribution. This results in the estimation of an effect for 
each participant in the study, which is sometimes useful, for example, where 
one wishes to make predictions for individual participants. The effects of other 
variables in the model, say of priming, are interpreted as conditional on a partic-
ipant, that is, the effect of priming if one keeps the participant fixed. GEEs make 
weaker assumptions about the nature of the participant effects. They control for, 
but do not explicitly estimate, the effect of each participant. The effects of other 
variables in the model are interpreted as averaged over all participants in the 
study. GEEs are generally considered more appropriate when interest is on aver-
age effects across the entire sample of participants, rather than on the effect that 
individual participants have, in which case GLMMs are preferred.13 Our interest 
is almost exclusively on the effect of our main experimental variables (different 
type of evidence, priming, anchoring), and while the dependencies induced by 
the presence of multiple responses per participant should be accounted for, they 
are not, for us, of primary interest. We thus prefer GEEs, which we implement 
using the geepack package in R.14
3.2.1. Statistical methods: Survey 1
In survey 1, the outcome – the number of positive responses to each justification 
question – was assumed to be binomially distributed, conditional on the proba-
bility of holding the relevant belief to be justified. Potential correlations between 
answers for the same respondent were accounted for using generalized estimating 
equations with respondents treated as the subject variable and independent cor-
relation matrices used. In our first analysis, the probability of holding belief in the 
lottery proposition to be justified was modeled as being dependent on the type 
of evidence used (statistical, testimonial, or mixed) and on whether respondents 
were first primed with the question about the probabilistic lottery proposition. 
The explanatory variables thus include categorical fixed effects for type of evi-
dence (three levels) and for priming (two levels), and interaction terms between 
these two effects. As usual for binomial GEEs, the linear dependency between 
the probability of a justified belief attribution and the explanatory variables was 
specified using a logit link function. Significance was assessed using Wald chi-
square statistics. Following model fitting, post hoc tests were used to compare 
means involving primed and unprimed responses within each evidence type (i.e., 
statistical, testimonial, or mixed) and to compare means involving different evi-
dence types within each of the primed and unprimed subsets of responses. Means 
involving different types of evidence and different priming conditions were not 
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compared. The Sidak method was used to adjust for multiple comparisons in 
these post hoc tests.
In our second analysis, the probability of a justified belief ascription was mod-
eled as being dependent on the type of evidence provided (statistical, testimonial, 
or mixed) and on whether the question was about the lottery proposition or the 
probabilistic lottery proposition. The explanatory variables thus included cate-
gorical fixed effects for type of evidence (three levels) and for the proposition 
involved (two levels), and interaction terms between these two effects. In other 
respects, the analysis is conducted as described above.
Confidence responses were strongly skewed toward the high end of the confi-
dence scale. As a result, we transformed confidence responses into a binary scale 
(totally confident/not totally confident) and analyzed the resulting transformed 
variable using binomial GEEs, as described above.
3.2.2. Statistical methods: Survey 2
Data were again analyzed using generalized estimating equations (GEEs) imple-
mented in R. The number of positive responses to each justification question was 
assumed to be binomially distributed, conditional on the probability of judging 
the relevant belief to be justified. Potential correlations between answers for the 
same respondent were accounted for using generalized estimating equations with 
respondents treated as the subject variable and independent correlation matrices 
used. In our first analysis, the probability of judging the belief in the lottery prop-
osition to be justified was modeled as being dependent on the type of evidence 
(statistical, testimonial, or mixed) and on whether respondents were first primed 
with the small lottery (1 in 10,000 chance of winning) or with the universal lottery 
(1 in 1080 chance of winning). The explanatory variables thus include categorical 
fixed effects for type of evidence (three levels) and for priming (two levels), and 
interaction terms between these two effects. In our second analysis, the probabil-
ity of a positive response to the effect that the lottery proposition is known was 
modeled as being dependent on the type of evidence (statistical, testimonial, or 
mixed) and on whether the small lottery or universal lottery anchor was used. The 
explanatory variables thus include categorical fixed effects for type of evidence 
(three levels) and for priming (two levels), and interaction terms between these 
two effects. In other respects, the analysis was conducted as described for survey 
1. Confidence responses were again transformed into a binary scale (totally con-
fident/not totally confidence) and analyzed using binomial GEEs, as for survey 1.
4. Results
In this section, we present a detailed analysis of the survey results. Figures are used 
as descriptive summaries of responses, while significant results are summarized 
for each survey in the respective table. In Section 5, we then discuss how these 
results affect the seven hypotheses presented in Section 2.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
 at
 07
:44
 18
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  13
4.1. Survey 1: Main results
We can summarize four main results from survey 1 as follows (see Table 1 and 
Figure 1):
Figure 1.  Tendency to ascribe justified belief in the lottery proposition depends on type of 
evidence used, but not on priming (U = unprimed, P = primed).
Notes: The left-hand plot shows the proportion supporting justified belief in the lottery proposition while the 
right-hand plot shows the proportion reporting total confidence in their judgments. Bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals (wide confidence intervals are due to low number of responses in that group).
Table 1. Effect sizes and summaries obtained from statistical models fitted to the data from sur-
vey 1.
Outcome Predictor Predictor levels Wald χ2 DoF p-value
Significantly 
different pairs
Response (J/not-J) Type of evidence (s)tatistical,  
(T)estimonial, 
(M)ixed
28.9 2 <0.001 s & T, T & M
Priming (U)nprimed,  
(P)rimed
0.42 1 0.520
Response (J/not-J) Type of evidence statistical, testi-
monial, mixed
22.4 2 <0.001 s & T
Proposition lP (U/P), PlP 4.16 1 0.041 lP & PlP
Proposition × Evi-
dence
6.11 2 0.047 see text
confidence Justified belief Justified, not 
justified
21.2 1 <0.001 J & not-J
Type of evidence statistical, testi-
monial, mixed
91.5 2 <0.001 s & T, T & M
Priming (U)nprimed,  
(P)rimed
0.1 1 0.802
Priming × Evi-
dence
6.4 2 0.041 see text
confidence Justified belief Justified, not 
justified
27.7 1 <0.001 J & not-J
Type of evidence statistical, Testi-
monial, Mixed
74 2 <0.001 s & T, T & M
Proposition lP (U/P), PlP 7.5 2 0.024 lP & PlP
Just × Evidence 7.6 2 0.022 see text
Just × Proposi-
tion
5.6 1 0.018 see text
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1.  The vast majority of participants agree that belief in lottery propositions 
is justified. Participants who agreed that belief in lottery propositions is 
justified were also more confident in their answer than those opposing it.
2.  Participants were more inclined to ascribe justified belief in a lottery 
proposition on the basis of testimonial evidence, in contrast to the statis-
tical and mixed evidence types. They also exhibited greater confidence in 
their answers.
3.  Participants were more inclined to ascribe justified belief in a probabilis-
tic lottery proposition than a categorical lottery proposition. Greater con-
fidence was also reported when ascribing justified belief of probabilistic 
lottery propositions. Participants’ tendency to ascribe justified belief in 
a probabilistic lottery proposition was consistent across the testimonial, 
statistical, and mixed evidence types.
4.  Priming, by first presenting a probabilistic lottery proposition, exerted 
no significant effect over subsequent judgments about whether belief in 
a lottery proposition was justified, or over confidence in that judgment.
4.1.1. Result 1: The vast majority of participants agree that belief in lottery 
propositions is justified
Pooling all responses, and thus disregarding the types of evidence on the basis 
of which subjects made their judgments, around 89% of respondents answered 
that Harry/Jennifer were both justified in believing that the ticket had lost (715 
of 800 responses).
Subjects who supported justified belief in LP tended to be far more confident 
in their response than those who did not. Of 711 responses in support of justified 
belief in the lottery proposition (4 subjects did not report confidence ratings), 437 
of these (62%) indicated total confidence in this response. Among the 84 valid 
responses against justified belief in lottery propositions, only 26 (31%) were totally 
confident. The effect of judging the lottery proposition to be justifiably believed 
on reported confidence level is highly significant (z = 4.18, p < 0.001).
4.1.2. Result 2: Participants were more inclined to ascribe justified belief in 
a lottery proposition on the basis of testimonial evidence, in contrast to the 
statistical and mixed evidence types
Subjects judging on the basis of testimonial evidence were relatively more likely 
to judge that the lottery proposition is justifiably believed (96%, compared to 83% 
and 89% of those seeing statistical and mixed evidence, respectively, χ2 = 91.5, 
p < 0.01). Post hoc tests indicated that the testimonial group significantly differed 
from both statistical and mixed groups (z = 5.00, p < 0.001 and z = 2.90, p = 0.011, 
respectively), but that the statistical and mixed groups were only marginally dif-
ferent (z = 2.32, p = 0.060).
Confidence was significantly higher when the evidence was testimonial, but 
only among those supporting justified belief in the lottery proposition (χ2 = 6.4, 
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PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  15
p = 0.041). 85% of respondents supporting justified belief reported total confi-
dence when receiving testimonial information, compared to 44 and 52% when 
using statistical and mixed information, respectively. Among those not supporting 
justified belief in the lottery proposition, 40% of respondents reported total con-
fidence when receiving testimonial information, compared to 34 and 23% when 
using statistical and mixed information, respectively. Post hoc tests indicated 
that, among supporting responses, those obtained by testimonial information 
differed significantly from both statistical and mixed groups (z = 9.51, p < 0.001 
and z = 8.47, p < 0.001, respectively), but that none of the differences among 
responses opposing justified belief were significant (all z < 1.40, all p > 0.163).
4.1.3. Result 3: Participants were more inclined to ascribe justified belief in a 
probabilistic lottery proposition than a categorical lottery proposition
Although subjects were asked about Harry’s belief in a probabilistic lottery prop-
osition primarily to test for the presence of a priming effect, it is instructive to 
note that subjects answered this question differently than they answered ques-
tions about categorical lottery propositions, which suggests that subjects under-
stood the difference between PLP and LP. More subjects supported justified 
belief in the probabilistic lottery proposition (246 of 261 responses, 94%) than 
the categorical lottery proposition (Result 1, 89%). This difference is moderately 
significant (χ2 = 4.16, p = 0.041). In contrast to the case of categorical lottery 
propositions, participants’ willingness to ascribe justification for the probabilistic 
lottery proposition was independent of the type of evidence presented: precisely 
the same proportion of subjects, 94%, judged that one could justifiably believe 
the probabilistic lottery proposition using any of the statistical, testimonial, or 
mixed evidence formats. This interaction effect, between type of evidence and 
the type of proposition being probed, is also moderately significant χ2 = 6.11, 
p = 0.047).
As reported in Result 1, subjects who supported justified belief in the lottery 
proposition tended to be more confident in their response than those who did 
not. This effect is stronger for subjects supporting justified belief in the proba-
bilistic lottery proposition (χ2 = 5.56, p < 0.001). 68% of those who supported 
justified belief in the probabilistic lottery proposition indicated total confidence, 
compared to just 7% of those who opposed it. Recall that these proportions were 
62 and 33% for the standard lottery proposition – smaller but still significant 
(z = 3.98, p < 0.001).
4.1.4. Result 4: We found no significant effects indicating priming. First 
presenting a probabilistic lottery proposition exerted no statistically recoverable 
effect over subsequent judgments about whether belief in a lottery proposition 
was justified, or over confidence in that judgment
Similar proportions of subjects supported justified belief in the lottery proposi-
tion in the primed and unprimed groups. Of 260 primed responses, 229 (88%) 
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supported justified belief, compared with 486 of 540 unprimed responses (90%). 
This difference is not significant (z = 1.02, p = 0.31). Confidence ratings were 
also similar across the two groups: 61% of primed subjects supporting justified 
belief in the lottery proposition reported total confidence, compared with 62% 
for un-primed subjects. Confidence was lower, but still similar across priming 
conditions when justified belief was opposed: 27 and 33% of primed and unprimed 
responses were totally confident, respectively. None of these differences proved 
statistically significant (z = 0.03, p = 0.98; z = 0.71, p = 0.48, respectively).
The effect of the type of evidence was also robust with respect to priming, 
being clearly demonstrated in both primed and unprimed groups, but with no 
significant difference in the size of the effect between groups. The proportion of 
primed and unprimed subjects supporting justified belief in the lottery proposi-
tion was, respectively, 93 and 97% for testimonial information, 82 and 84% for 
statistical information, and 90 and 88% for mixed information. No significant 
interaction between the type of evidence involved and priming treatment was 
found (χ2 = 2.47, p = 0.29). Similarly, greater confidence was reported when using 
testimonial information, regardless of priming. Among primed subjects, total 
confidence was reported by 79% in the testimonial group, and 44 and 50% in the 
statistical and mixed groups, respectively. Among unprimed subjects, the propor-
tions were 85, 42, and 49%, respectively. Again, no significant difference in the 
effect of evidence type across priming treatments was found (χ2 = 1.3, p = 0.54).15
4.2. Survey 2: Main results
While survey 2 is primarily designed to test for anchoring effects as well as ques-
tions regarding people’s willingness to ascribe knowledge in these cases, it over-
laps with survey 1 in that it can also be used to gauge overall levels of support 
for justified belief in the lottery proposition, and confidence in those judgments. 
Again, pooling all the results and disregarding for a moment the type of evi-
dence on which the judgments are made, we find nearly identical results to those 
reported for survey 1, corroborating our result 1 above: 442 of 493 (90%) of 
responses in survey 2 answered that Harry was justified in believing that he had 
lost, compared with 89% in survey 1. Overall confidence was lower than in survey 
1, but respondents who supported justified belief in the lottery proposition again 
tended to be far more confident. Of 439 responses in support of justified belief 
in the lottery proposition (3 subjects did not report confidence ratings), 183 of 
these (42%) indicated total confidence, compared to 62% in survey 1. Note that 
this discrepancy in confidence may simply be because survey 2 did not contain 
a vignette using testimonial evidence, while survey 1 did, and it is here that the 
confidence values were found to be very high (compare 4.1.2).
Among the 51 valid responses that denied justified belief in the lottery propo-
sition, 10 (20%) were totally confident, compared to 31% in survey 1. The effect of 
positive or negative response on reported confidence is again significant (χ2 = 5.58, 
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p = 0.018) though not to the extent reported in survey 1 (χ2 = 27.7, p < 0.001). 
Besides reinforcing overall support for people’s tendency to ascribe justified belief 
in lottery propositions, our main results from survey 2 are as follows (see Table 
2 and Figure 2 unless otherwise stated):
1.  The majority of participants denied that lottery propositions are known. 
Similar confidence was reported when ascribing either justified belief 
or knowledge, but less confidence was reported when denying justified 
belief than when denying knowledge.
2.  Participants were more inclined to ascribe both justified belief and 
knowledge of lottery propositions, and were more confident in their 
responses, when presented with the additional contextual information of 
the so-called Mafia case.
Figure 2. Justified belief in lP is more often supported than knowledge of lP.
Notes: The left-hand plot shows the proportion supporting justified belief in, or knowledge of, lP while the right-
hand plot shows the proportion reporting total confidence in their judgments. Bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals (wide confidence intervals are due to low number of responses in that group).
Table 2. Effect sizes and summaries obtained from statistical models fitted to the data from sur-
vey 2.
Outcome Predictor Predictor Levels Wald χ2 DoF p-value
Significantly 
different pairs
Response (J/not-J); 
(K/not-K)
Type of evidence 1:14 M, 1:100 M, 
Mafia
12.3 1 0.002 1:14 M & Mafia, 
1:100 M & Mafia
Epistemic status JB, knowledge 152.5 1 <0.001 JB & K
anchor small, Universal 0.2 2 0.623
anchor x Evi-
dence
4.7 1 0.093 see text
anchor × Epis-
temic status
2.8 1 0.097 see text
confidence Response J/K, not-J/not-K 5.58 1 0.018 J/K & not-J/not-K
Type of evidence 1:100 M, Mafia 7.33 2 0.26 1:14 M, Mafia
Epistemic status JB, Knowledge 5.62 1 0.018 JB & K (for not-J/
not-K only)
anchor 1:10 K, Universal 0.07 1 0.789
Response × Epis-
temic status
6.54 1 0.011 see text
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3.  Changing the size of the lottery, and the underlying probabilities, had no 
effect on participants’ willingness to ascribe knowledge, but did have an 
effect on the participants’ willingness to ascribe justified belief (Table 3, 
Figure 3).
4.  Anchoring, by first asking participants a question about a larger (i.e., uni-
versal lottery) or smaller lottery, exerted no effect over subsequent judg-
ments about justified belief or knowledge of lottery propositions, or over 
confidence in those judgments.
4.2.1. Result 1: The majority of participants denied that lottery propositions are 
known
Many more respondents supported justified belief in lottery propositions (442 of 
493 responses, 90%) than knowledge in lottery propositions (94 of 494 responses, 
19%). This difference is highly significant (χ2 = 152.5, p < 0.001).
Table 3. Differences in judgment with respect to small lottery and universal lottery.
Outcome Predictor Predictor levels Wald χ2 DoF p-value
Significantly 
different pairs
Response (J/not-J); 
(K/not-K)
size small, universal 5.6 1 0.018 small & Universal 
(JB only)
Epistemic status JB, knowledge 142.2 1 <0.001 JB & K
size × Epistemic 
status
4.3 1 0.039 see text
confidence Response J/K, not-J/not-K 0.68 1 0.408
Epistemic status JB, knowledge 13.50 1 <0.001 JB & K (small 
only)
size small, universal 3.78 1 0.052 small & Universal 
(JB only)
size × Epistemic 
status
7.36 1 0.007 see text
Response × Epis-
temic status
4.10 1 0.043 see text
Figure 3. Differences in judgment with respect to small lottery and universal lottery.
Note: Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals (wide confidence intervals are due to low number of responses in that 
group).
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There is some very weak evidence to suggest that the difference observed 
between support for justified belief and knowledge depends on the anchoring 
question used (χ2 = 2.8, p = 0.097). Support for justified belief increased when 
the Universal lottery was used as anchor (93 vs. 86% using the small lottery 
anchor). However, support for knowledge of the same marginally decreased with 
the Universal lottery as anchor (17 vs. 21% using the small lottery as anchor).
Post hoc tests showed the differences between knowledge ascription and jus-
tified belief ascription within each anchoring group to be highly significant (for 
the small lottery anchor z = 8.21, p < 0.001; for the Universal anchor z = 8.88, 
p < 0.001), with the increased significance seen for the small lottery anchor pro-
viding the basis for the marginally significant interaction. Given its marginal 
significance level, this interaction effect must be interpreted with caution, but we 
report it here for completeness and as a possible avenue for future work.
Confidence was significantly higher when concerned with knowledge of lottery 
propositions than justified belief (χ2 = 5.62, p = 0.018), but only among those 
opposing the relevant statement (χ2 = 6.54, p = 0.011). Among all opposing or 
disagreeing responses, 20% reported total confidence when the statement was 
about justified belief, compared to 56% when the statement was about knowledge. 
No such difference was observed among supporting responses, where 42 and 
43% reported total confidence when the statement was about justified belief and 
knowledge, respectively.
Post hoc tests confirmed that the difference between groups opposing justified 
belief and knowledge was significant (z = 2.85, p = 0.026). Thus, not only did many 
more subjects reject the claim that Harry could know he had lost, but they were 
also relatively more confident in this rejection.
4.2.2. Result 2: Participants were more inclined to ascribe both justified 
belief and knowledge of lottery propositions, when presented with additional 
contextual information of the ‘Mafia’ case
Subjects were relatively more likely to support justified belief and knowledge 
statements when given the additional information that the Mafia had manip-
ulated the lottery (χ2 = 7.33, p = 0.026). 92 and 24% of responses supported 
justified belief and knowledge, respectively, compared to 89 and 17% (1:100 
million chance) and 89 and 16% (1:14 million chance) when only statistical 
information was provided.
Post hoc tests indicated that the Mafia group significantly differed from both 
1:100 million (no Mafia) and 1:14 million groups (z = 3.10, p = 0.005 and z = 3.29, 
p = 0.003, respectively), but that the latter two groups are not significantly differ-
ent (z = 0.23, p = 0.994). Although empirical proportions show that additional 
information has a greater impact on support for knowledge (24% in the Mafia 
group; 17 and 16% in the other groups) than on support for justified belief, this 
interaction between epistemic status and type of evidence proved not to be sig-
nificant (χ2 = 3.2, p = 0.203).
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A very marginally significant interaction exists between the type of evidence 
used and the anchoring question used (χ2 = 4.7, p = 0.093). Post hoc tests showed 
that the increased support for both justified belief and knowledge observed using 
the Mafia case was only significant using the small lottery anchor (comparison 
with 1:14 Million group, z = 3.28, p = 0.006; comparison with 1:100 Million group, 
z = 2.78, p = 0.032; other p > 0.53). Among responses obtained with a small lottery 
anchor, 90 and 29% were supportive of justified belief and knowledge respectively 
in the Mafia case, compared to 85 and 18% of those exposed to the 1:100 million 
(but no Mafia) and 83 and 17% of those exposed to the 1:14 million vignettes. The 
same proportions among responses obtained with the universal lottery anchor 
were 93%/21% (Mafia), 92%/16% (1:100 Million), and 94%/15% (1:14 Million); 
differences between the Mafia and other groups are here somewhat smaller. Given 
the marginal significance of the interaction effect, these post hoc tests and the 
conclusions drawn from them should be interpreted with caution.
Subjects were more confident in their responses when given additional infor-
mation about the Mafia. As stated above (result 1), higher confidence was reported 
for those opposing knowledge than those opposing justified belief, but similar 
confidence levels were reported by those supporting knowledge/justified belief. 
Supporters of both justified belief and knowledge did, however, report more con-
fidence in the Mafia case (justified belief: 47% with Mafia information, 40 and 
38% using statistical information; knowledge: 48% using Mafia information, 39 
and 38% using statistical information). No such difference was observed among 
opposers (justified belief: 21% with Mafia information, 21 and 17% using statis-
tical information; knowledge: 56% using Mafia information, 57 and 54% using 
statistical information). Note that only the main effect (of type of evidence on 
confidence) is moderately significant (χ2 = 7.33, p = 0.026). In contrast to survey 
1, the effect of type of evidence on confidence in survey 2 does not depend statis-
tically on any of the other experimental variables, as shown by the absence of any 
significant interactions involving the type of evidence. Thus, additional inferences 
about the role of epistemic status and support or opposition for this status must 
be interpreted as speculative. Finally, post hoc tests indicated that only the Mafia 
and 1:14 million groups differed significantly (z = 2.82, p = 0.014).
4.2.3. Result 3: We found no significant effect on participants’ willingness to 
ascribe knowledge when changing the size of the lottery, that is, the underlying 
probabilities. However, changes in the size of the lottery did have an effect on 
the participants’ willingness to ascribe justified belief
A significantly lower proportion of subjects supported justified belief when a small 
lottery was presented, compared to the universal lottery (z = 2.57, p = 0.023). In the 
small lottery, 64/78 (82%) of subjects support justified belief in LP; that proportion 
increases to 84/87 (97%) in the case of the universal lottery. No effect, however, was 
observed with regard to the knowledge question (z = 0.58, p = 0.96). Considering 
the small and the universal lotteries, respectively, the proportion of subjects 
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supporting knowledge of LP was 11/78 (14%) and 15/86 (17%). Collectively, these 
proportions describe the significant joint (i.e., interaction) effect of lottery size 
and epistemic status on participant responses (χ2 = 4.3, p = 0.039).
A significantly greater proportion of subjects reported greater confidence in 
ascribing justified beliefs in LP in the universal lottery compared to the small lottery 
(z = 2.99, p = 0.016). No significant differences in confidence were found between 
those supporting and those opposing justified belief16, and we thus pooled results 
across these groups. 39/87 (45%) of those faced with the universal lottery were confi-
dent in their response, compared to 16/78 (21%) of those faced with the small lottery. 
No such difference in confidence was observed in the case of knowledge (z = 0.08, 
p > 0.99), where the relevant proportions were 49 and 51%. The interaction effect 
between anchor and epistemic status was highly significant (χ2 = 7.36, p = 0.007).
4.2.4. Result 4: Judgments about justified belief or knowledge of lottery 
propositions, and the confidence with which these judgments were made, did 
not differ significantly over anchoring conditions
As in survey 1, similar proportions of responses supported justified belief in LP across 
priming groups. Of 234 responses primed with the small lottery anchor, 199 (86%) 
and 49 (21%) were supportive of justified belief and knowledge respectively, compared 
with 243 (93%) and 45 (17%) of 261 responses seeing the universal lottery anchor.
This difference is not significant (χ2 = 0.2, p = 0.62). As mentioned in result 1 
above, there is weak evidence to suggest that the effect of type of evidence used, 
in particular the provision of additional contextual information in the form of the 
Mafia statement, may not be robust to anchoring effects, with support for justified 
belief increasing with a universal lottery anchor but support for knowledge of 
the same decreasing (χ2 = 4.7, p = 0.093). We reiterate that this result should be 
interpreted as speculative.
Confidence ratings are also similar: 47% of responses primed with the small 
lottery anchor reported total confidence compared with 46% of those seeing the 
universal lottery anchor (χ2 = 0.07, p = 0.78). No significant interactions with 
other experimental variables were reported.
5. Discussion
In this section, we will briefly discuss our results in the context of the seven 
hypotheses we offered in Section 2.
5.1. Hypotheses 1 and 2: No-knowledge and yes-justification
Both hypotheses received strong support from our survey study. Subjects have a 
clear tendency to deny knowledge of lottery propositions when the evidence is 
statistical (81% deny knowledge of LP, 19% ascribe knowledge of LP; compare 
4.2.1), while most subjects are willing to ascribe a justified belief in the lottery 
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proposition based purely on statistical evidence (83%17 ascribe justified belief in 
LP; compare 4.1.2). In general, subjects exhibit high confidence in their answers. 
These findings are broadly in line with the studies by Turri and Friedman (2014) 
and Friedman and Turri (2015).
5.2. Hypothesis 3: Testimonial
Testimonial evidence had a significant effect with respect to an increased will-
ingness to ascribe justified belief compared to pure statistical cases, and higher 
confidence in the given response (if the answer is positive). As such hypothesis 
3 also received strong support from our survey (compare 4.1.2). Our findings 
are again broadly in line with the previous studies by Turri and Friedman (2014) 
and Friedman and Turri (2015). The issue about mixed cases will be discussed 
further in Section 6.
5.3. Hypothesis 4: Probabilistic
Our survey provides support for the hypotheses that subjects have a stronger 
tendency to ascribe justified belief in probabilistic lottery propositions (94%) 
than in categorical lottery propositions (89%), irrespective of the type of evidence. 
Noteworthy here is also that confidence levels are higher in the former than in 
the latter case. Also, we found that subjects’ willingness to ascribe justified belief 
in PLP is not affected by the relevant kind of evidence (compare 4.1.3). As such, 
the second part of our hypothesis that the increase is most pronounced when the 
evidence is statistical is also supported by the results of survey 1, since here we 
have the highest increase (from 83 to 94%).18
5.4. Hypothesis 5: Priming
In contrast to our own expectations, we have not found any significant priming 
effects. While subjects assess probabilistic and categorical lottery propositions 
differently, in particular when assessing them in the context of statistical evidence 
(compare 5.3), being made aware of that distinction had no significant effect on 
their judgments about categorical lottery propositions (compare 4.1.4). Moreover, 
no significant differences were found with regard to primed and non-primed 
subjects’ confidence levels. As such, this raises doubts about the correctness of 
Sutton’s suggestions quoted earlier that the general tendency to ascribe justified 
belief in LP is in part due to a conflation between LP and PLP.
5.5. Hypothesis 6: Large lotteries
In contrast to our own expectations, we found no significant changes in subjects’ 
willingness to ascribe knowledge when strongly varying the strength of statistical 
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evidence. This contrasts with our finding that a subject’s willingness to ascribe 
justified belief in LP is affected by the strength of statistical evidence (compare 
4.2.3). Also, the confidence of subjects ascribing justified belief increases when 
the probability of winning decreases. Hence, this result supports the claim made 
by Vogel, Cohen, Williamson, and others that the odds of a lottery do not affect 
knowledge ascription. We will discuss this further below.
5.6. Hypothesis 7: Anchoring
Given that we found no significant variation in subjects’ willingness to ascribe 
knowledge, depending upon the size of the lottery, there were no discernible 
anchoring effects with respect to knowledge ascription either. We may note that 
there is some very weak evidence that willingness to ascribe justified belief may 
be affected by the relevant anchors; however, further research is required to inves-
tigate this initial finding.
6. General remarks
Our results confirm the basic findings of Turri and Friedman that lay judgments 
about when we can know lottery propositions largely accord with those of phi-
losophers. In addition, the main findings from our survey can be summarized 
as follows:
1.  Contextual information plays an important role and may trump proba-
bilistic information when ascribing knowledge.
2.  The size of a lottery has no effect on whether people are willing to ascribe 
knowledge of lottery propositions when the evidence is statistical.
3.  We did not detect any priming effects, that is, people primed with a ques-
tion about probabilistic lottery propositions were just as willing to ascribe 
justified belief in lottery propositions as those that were not primed by 
this distinction.
Contextual information, such as that provided in the Mafia case, has a significant 
effect on people’s willingness to ascribe knowledge of a lottery proposition. Here 
we found a significant increase in knowledge judgments from 16 to 24%, and sub-
jects were more confident in their responses as well. Friedman and Turri (2015) 
observed a similar pattern, with 35% of subjects ascribing knowledge in a Mafia-
type case, compared to only 14% in a pure statistical case. Curiously, Turri and 
Friedman (2014) found no increased willingness to ascribe knowledge of a lottery 
proposition in a Mafia-type case, as opposed to a statistical case. Comparison 
between these studies has to be treated with care, however: variations might have 
to do with the precise nature of the contextual information and the way in which 
it is provided.19 In general, questions about when and how additional contextual 
information can trigger different knowledge judgments may be a fruitful avenue 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
din
bu
rg
h]
 at
 07
:44
 18
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
24   P. A. EBERT ET AL.
for further research. While the Mafia information did, in our study, generate a 
significant effect on knowledge judgments, we found only a very marginally sig-
nificant difference between the mixed evidence and statistical evidence conditions 
in the first survey on justified belief. Hence, it may be that contextual information 
is more relevant to knowledge judgments (and the confidence with which they 
are made) than to justified belief judgments, though this too will need further 
investigation.
In addition, we found that lay judgments also conform to the claim made by 
Williamson, Cohen, and others that the size of a lottery makes no difference to 
whether lottery propositions can be known on the basis of statistical evidence. 
It is noteworthy, though, that, while a subject’s willingness to judge that a lottery 
proposition is known seems not to be affected by the size of the lottery and the 
probability of the proposition, when making judgments about justification, sub-
jects did show some tendency to track or respond to the underlying changes in 
probabilities. This observation is further strengthened by the fact that subjects’ 
confidence in ascribing justified belief in a lottery proposition increased as the 
chance of winning decreased – a phenomenon not found in the case of knowledge 
ascriptions. This result suggests a further difference between people’s reasoning 
about justification and about knowledge.
In hindsight, it would have been valuable to test subjects’ judgments about 
whether lottery propositions can be known or justifiably believed in the case of a 
very small lottery with a higher chance of winning (say 1 in 5) to get a better sense 
of when the small proportion (roughly 16%) of subjects who do ascribe knowledge 
on the basis of statistical evidence, and the large proportion who ascribe justifi-
cation, tend to switch their judgment. A follow-up study of this kind might also 
help to shed further light on the relationship between knowledge, justification, 
and liability judgments.
As we noted previously, in a follow-up study to Wells (1992), Wright and col-
leagues (1996) showed that a majority of subjects are willing to ascribe liability 
on the basis of purely statistical evidence, provided that the probability of liability 
is sufficiently high. The study revealed that while mock jurors (in a civil case) are 
unwilling to ascribe liability if the bare statistical evidence made liability a mere 
80% likely, a majority of mock jurors returned a positive liability judgment when 
this was increased to 99.9%.20 Hence, it seems that the relevant probabilities are 
taken into account by subjects when considering liability (at least in a civil case).21 
This may suggest that liability judgments in the given contexts are closer in one 
respect to justification judgments than knowledge judgments (when the evidence 
is purely statistical): subjects are generally sensitive to the strength of statistical 
evidence in liability and justification judgments, while knowledge judgments 
appear to exhibit no such sensitivity. Further studies which more directly probe 
the connections between these three kinds of judgment would be needed to test 
these speculative suggestions.22
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Further conclusions about the philosophical significance of these results will 
be guarded. Insofar as philosophers claim that people are inclined to make certain 
lottery judgments and use this to support a theory directly, or to establish an ade-
quacy constraint on theories, that claim has to be established by the appropriate 
means and methods. In that respect, our study supports the claim that people 
tend to judge in line with the lottery intuition. Of course, there can be doubts 
whether a survey setup is sufficiently reliable to elicit lay people’s intuitions, but 
we took a number of steps (i.e., adding an understanding question, offering sub-
jects the opportunity to say that they were not serious in their response, as well 
as deleting the fastest and slowest responses) to try and ensure that our surveys 
were a suitable tool.23 Hence, we think the onus is on the critic to say why there 
should be a difference between lay people’s thinking as exhibited in surveys and 
lay people’s intuitions properly understood.
There are, of course, various philosophical theories of knowledge and justi-
fication that “clash” with our results – in that judgments we found to be widely 
endorsed would be false according to the theories in question. This clash, in and 
of itself, provides no objection to a theory and, in many cases, would come as no 
surprise to its proponents. As discussed above, there are a number of theories of 
justification that predict that we lack justification for believing lottery propositions 
on the basis of statistical evidence. Proponents of these theories, however, gen-
erally acknowledge that this is a “counterintuitive” prediction that runs contrary 
to ordinary judgment and, in response, they tend to offer somewhat speculative 
hypotheses as to what might be driving the recalcitrant judgments. It is here that 
our results may have a more direct bearing. As discussed, our findings cast doubt 
on the hypothesis – put most starkly by Sutton, but hinted at by many others – that 
people’s tendency to judge that one can justifiably believe lottery propositions on 
the basis of statistical evidence is due to a conflation between lottery proposi-
tions and probabilistic lottery propositions. Any alternative suggestion as to the 
psychological mechanisms behind such judgments will be just as amenable to 
empirical testing.
Notes
1.  Some exceptions include Lycan (2006), Hill and Schechter (2007), and Reed (2010).
2.  See in particular Harman (1973), Vogel (1990), DeRose, and Hawthorne (2004).
3.  Numerous other philosophers have invoked the lottery intuition in the assertion 
debate, to name a few: Hinchman (2013) and McKinnon (2013).
4.  Turri and Friedman cite Nelkin (2000) and Sutton (2007) as proponents of the view. 
As noted above, Nelkin and Sutton do claim that one cannot know or justifiably 
believe lottery propositions on the basis of statistical evidence, but at no point, as 
far as we are aware, do they suggest that our tendency to make the former judgment 
is explained by our tendency to make the latter judgment. Both Nelkin and Sutton 
offer arguments for the claim that one cannot justifiably believe a lottery proposition 
on the basis of statistical evidence. Here, the claim that one cannot know a lottery 
proposition on the basis of statistical evidence effectively functions as a premise in 
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these arguments. Hence, their dialectical strategy is very difficult to square with the 
justification account. In fact, using the knowledge denial, along with certain bridging 
principles, to derive the justification denial is a common argumentative trope in this 
area; see, for example, Bird (2007), Smith (2016, ch. 1), and Ichikawa (2014).
5.  Compare here, for example, the so-called expertise defense, according to which lay 
people, in contrast to professional philosophers, lack the relevant skills and expertise 
that is required when assessing thought experiments in an unbiased way. Their 
assessment of philosophical thought experiments is thus unreliable and of limited 
significance. This kind of response was first mooted in Weinberg and colleagues 
(Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001) and developed further by numerous other authors, 
such as Williamson (2004), Ludwig (2007), Kauppinen (2007), Williamson (2009a), 
Horvath (2010), and Williamson (2011). For recent responses and further discussion, 
see Weinberg, Gonnerman, Buckner, and Alexander (2010), Clarke (2013), Turri 
(2013), Rini (2014), Mizrahi (2015), Horvath and Wiegmann (2016), and Liao (2016). 
For a recent survey, see Nado (2014).
6.  See, for example, Cappelen (2013); for a response, see Climenhaga (in press).
7.  Compare Climenhaga (in press), who offers further examples and discussion of the 
use of intuitions in epistemology and philosophy more generally.
8.  The specific numbers of deletion are as follows. In survey 1 version 1, there was a 
total of 18 deletions: 6 for time, 7 for failed comprehension, 3 non-english, and 2 
for participating in a previous study. In survey 1 version 2, there was a total of 13 
deletions: 6 for time, 6 failed comprehension, and 6 for participating in a previous 
study; some people violated multiple conditions. In survey 2 version 1, there was a 
total of 20 deletions: 6 for time, 10 failed comprehension, 2 non-english, 5 having a 
degree in philosophy, and 1 for participating in a previous study. In survey 2 version 
2, there was a total of 12 deletions: 6 for time, 1 failed comprehension, 1 non-english, 
2 having philosophy degree, and 4 for participating in a previous study.
9.  This avoids an ambiguity which may be present in vignettes used in previous studies. 
After all, in the UK National Lottery, two matching numbers is enough to win a 
free lucky dip (with close to 1 million tickets matching two numbers each week). 
Compare: www.national-lottery.co.uk.
10.  Compare here, for example, Sripada and Stanley (2012, section 1.2).
11.  See for further discussion Bender and Lange (2001).
12.  See, however, Gardiner, Luo, and Roman (2009) and Hubbard et al. (2010) for further 
discussion.
13.  Again, for further discussion, consult Hubbard et al. (2010).
14.  See Halekoh, Højsgaard, and Yan (2006) and R Core Team (2016).
15.  This, of course, isn’t to say that there categorically is no priming effect – that would be 
to accept the null hypotheses, which we like to refrain from doing.
16.  Participants who opposed knowledge were marginally more confident than 
participants who opposed justified belief (z = 2.05, p = 0.079), while there was no 
significant difference in the confidence of those supporting knowledge and those 
supporting justified belief (z = 0.24, p = 0.96). This is the reason for the significant 
interaction between response and epistemic status reported in Table 3. What we mean 
here, however, is that because the size of the anchor plays no additional role, pooling 
across anchoring groups is justified.
17.  Note, however, this increases to 97% in the case of the universal lottery. See, for 
further discussion, 4.2.3 and 5.5.
18.  We should note, however, that subjects’ willingness to ascribe justified belief in LP 
seems to track the underlying probabilities. So, while our hypothesis is correct with 
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respect to the relevant probabilities used in survey 1, the relevant difference may not 
be as pronounced when the statistical evidence increases in strength. Compare 4.2.3 
and 5.5 for further discussion.
19.  Indeed, we found a marginally significant interaction in the Mafia case with the small 
lottery anchor, which may be worth further investigation. Compare Section 4.2.2 for 
details.
20.  While 30% provide a positive verdict in the 80% case, 63% provide a positive verdict 
in the 99.9% scenario; compare Wright et al. (1996, p. 685).
21.  A phenomenon we attempted to recreate – but clearly failed – with regard to 
knowledge judgments using even higher probabilities.
22.  The connection between liability judgments and knowledge judgments has been the 
subject of recent attention from philosophers. For two somewhat contrasting views 
see Enoch and colleagues (Enoch, Spectre, & Fisher, 2012) and Blome-Tillmann 
(2016).
23.  The “intuitions” that we (PE and MS) observed in our classrooms could not be 
recreated in the more controlled survey setting leading us to think that we did 
unintentionally influence the responses.
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